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the Conservatives adopted a pragmatic approach, 
realizing that membership could support Britain’s 
economic recovery by opening access to new 
industrial markets, and so halt its declining status as a 
world power. The Labour Party, for its part, was deeply 
sceptical: Hugh Gaitskell famously characterised the 
notion of Britain joining a federalising Europe as ‘the 
end of a thousand years of history’. Later, Harold 
Wilson managed to broker a compromise position—
grudgingly supportive of membership, but critical of 
the terms obtained by Heath on entry—but this barely 
masked the divisions in the parliamentary party. 
These positions were to reverse in the years following 
Margaret Thatcher’s speech in Bruges, in which 
she successfully tapped into a discourse stressing 
the incompatibility of supranational authority and 
national democracy, which had been evident at least 
since Gaitskell’s comments in 1962. This message 
now resonated with a growing eurosceptic element 
within her own party, and following her ouster John 
Major inherited a party openly divided between those 
The following is based on a lecture given at the EU-
Japan Friendship Week Symposium, held at Waseda 
University on 6 July 2017. The symposium was co-
organised by the Waseda Institute of Political Economy 
(WINPEC) and the Organisation for Regional and 
Inter-regional Studies (ORIS) at Waseda University. 
For narrative purposes, the lecture was structured as 
a three-act play, examining Brexit in the past, present 
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events in the second half of 2017.
Act I: Brexit past
Scene 1: The history
We open with a little scene-setting, establishing some 
narrative threads which will run through our story. 
First, the UK’s political parties – with a few consistent 
exceptions – have always struggled with the issue of 
European integration. Around the time of the UK’s 
application to join the European Community (EC), 
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for whom European integration represented an erosion 
of parliamentary sovereignty, and a second faction 
who traded such purist concerns for a pragmatic 
acceptance that membership as vital for Britain’s 
long-term economic future.1 For Labour, meanwhile, 
the trauma of the split of 1981, the formation of the 
Social Democratic Party, and a fear of being led from 
the hard left, pushed the party towards the centre 
ground, gradually it shed its opposition to Europe, and 
through the successive tenures of Neil Kinnock, John 
Smith and Tony Blair, it forged a new acceptance of 
Europe.
???????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????
were themselves shaped by, the shifting tide of public 
opinion. Just before the 1975 referendum, a Gallup 
poll found that 41 per cent would vote to leave the 
European Economic Community (EEC); this dropped 
to 22 per cent when people were then asked whether 
renegotiated terms of membership would alter their 
attitudes. Indeed, by March 1979, a MORI poll found 
that 60 per cent would now vote to leave the EEC—
just four years after two-thirds of voters had backed 
staying in.2  Yet as Thatcher engaged successfully 
with the EC in the mid-1980s, and the Labour Party 
too began to move in a more pro-Europe direction, 
opinion shifted. In 1987 the polls stood at 47 per cent 
in favour of membership to 39 per cent against. This 
trend was broadly maintained throughout the 1990s, 
with dips in support often brought about by periodic 
instances of tension between Britain and the EU, such 
as the BSE3 crisis of 1996.
The upshot of all this was that by the last years of 
the twentieth century, both the Tories and Labour 
had adopted carefully calculated public positions on 
the EU in order to deal with internal divisions and 
lukewarm public approval. New Labour, which in 
opposition had ruthlessly capitalised on the Major 
government’s handling of European policy, softened 
its approach upon its election in 1997. Mindful of 
the harm Europe had caused both the Conservatives 
and his own party in the 1980s, Tony Blair adopted 
a policy of ‘utilitarian supranationalism’,4 engaging 
in constructive diplomacy with the EU while 
consciously downplaying its salience in the public 
arena. The Conservative Party, during its long period 
?????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????
wing, and subsequently to avoid attacking Labour’s 
European policy. This strategy was shared by both 
parties, and was predicated on a belief that relations 
with the EU could be handled at an elite level, and 
were not an issue of which the average voter should 
develop a critical awareness.  However – and this is 
the third thread – this had consequences for the nature 
of the public discourse on European integration. 
Granted, there had long been a simmering current of 
Euroscepticism in the public consciousness, but the 
strategy of clandestine engagement did little to foster 
an informed understanding of the pros and cons of 
EU membership. The press were complicit in this, 
engaging in ‘destructive dissent’ and scaremongering, 
with the EU portrayed as the origin of much inane and 
cumbersome regulation.5 With only lukewarm public 
approval for, or interest in, European integration, and 
1 See Anthony Forster (2002). Euroscepticism and British politics. London: Routledge.
2 Roger Mortimore (2016). ‘Polling history: 40 years of British views on “in or out” of Europe’, The Conversation. http://theconversation.
com/polling-history-40-years-of-british-views-on-in-or-out-of-europe-61250. Accessed 4 Oct 2016.
3 On the background of the crisis, and its domestic impact, see Roman Gerodimos (2004). ‘The UK BSE crisis as a failure of government’, 
Public Administration, 82(4): 911-929.
4 Simon Bulmer (2008). ‘New Labour, new European policy? Blair, Brown and utilitarian supranationalism’, ?????????????? ????? 61(4): 
597–620.
5 Oliver Daddow (2012). ‘The UK media and “Europe”: from permissive consensus to destructive dissent’, ???????????????????? 88(6): 
1221. See also Nicholas Startin (2015). ‘Have we reached a tipping point? The mainstreaming of Euroscepticism in the UK’, International 
Political Science Review 36(3): 311–23.
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6 Rafael Behr (2016). ‘How Remain failed: the inside story of a doomed campaign’, Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/
jul/05/how-remain-failed-inside-story-doomed-campaign. Accessed 26 Oct 2016.
7 Paul Waugh (2016). ‘Jeremy Corbyn allies “sabotaged” Labour’s in campaign on the EU referendum, critics claimed’, ????????????????.
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
49bb1f. Accessed 26 Oct 2016.
8 David A. L. Levy, Billur Aslan and Diego Bironzo (2016). ‘UK press coverage of the EU referendum’, University of Oxford/Reuters 
Institute for the Study of Journalism???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
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the media found little reason to offer detailed 
analysis – or actively to shape a positive narrative 
?????? ???? ???????? ??? ????????????? ?????????????? ????
example, a Eurobarometer poll in late 2015 showed the 
British public to be among the least knowledgeable on 
the EU, unable to answer questions such as whether 
Switzerland was a member.
Scene 2: The referendum
The referendum of 2016 emerged from this deep 
history. The proximate origins of the referendum have 
been dealt with elsewhere; rather, our concern is with 
how the events of April to July of 2016 bring these 
threads together.
The date of the referendum was announced in 
February 2016, and as soon as campaigning got 
under way, the Leave side worked to neutralise their 
opponents’ argument, and dismissed their basic 
message – that Brexit would be costly and staying 
in was safer – as overly negative. They marshalled a 
number of simple and powerful messages, such as 
‘I want my country back’, and ‘Take back control’. 
Against this, Remain camp’s appeals to economics, 
or lofty concepts such as ‘pooled sovereignty’ or 
‘transnational cooperation’, came over as remote 
and arcane.6 Leave were not afraid to support their 
slogans with statements which were at best inaccurate 
and at worst factually incorrect—for example, the 
frequently cited line that the UK sent £350 million 
a week to the EU, and that this sum could be used 
instead to fund the National Health Service (NHS). In 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????
merely derided the messengers, urging people not to 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of the dire consequences of Brexit.
The campaign groups cut across party lines, with each 
????? ?????????? ??????? ??????? ????? ??????? ???? ????
Conservatives. Many of the Conservative front bench 
backed Remain, but several prominent members of 
parliament (MPs) – including Michael Gove, Iain 
Duncan Smith, and Boris Johnson – campaigned for 
Leave. In the Labour Party, the picture was muddied 
by the fact that Jeremy Corbyn seemed reluctant to 
commit to Remain, refusing to share a platform with 
pro-European former leaders Tony Blair and Gordon 
Brown, and going on holiday during the closing stages 
of the campaign.7 Several vocal MPs formed the 
nucleus of Labour Leave, while elsewhere in the party 
disagreements surfaced on the issue of free movement.
The Leave camp had an ally in much of the media, 
which largely came out in support of Brexit. A study 
of press coverage found that 41 per cent of newspaper 
articles covering the referendum were pro-Leave, 
compared to 27 per cent in favour of Remain; six of 
the nine national newspapers leaned towards Brexit, 
with the strongest positions coming from the Daily 
Express, the Daily Mail and the Sun. Considering 
their readership, the study also found that the most 
avowedly Remain publications—the Guardian and 
the Financial Times—had the lowest reach, with 
the Daily Mail and the Sun at the other end of the 
spectrum.8 
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9 Matthew Goodwin and Oliver Heath (2016). ‘The 2016 referendum, Brexit and the left behind: an aggregate-level analysis of the result’, 
Political Quarterly 87(3): 323–32. See also Stephen Clarke and Matthew Whittaker (2016). ‘The importance of place: explaining the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Resolution Foundation. http://www.resolutionfoundation.
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Accessed 26 Oct 2016.
10 Monica Langella and Alan Manning (2016). ‘Who voted Leave: the characteristics of individuals mattered, but so did those of local 
areas’, LSE British Politics and Policy blog. http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/explaining-the-vote-for-brexit. Accessed 26 Oct 2016.
11 Clarke and Whittaker, ‘The importance of place’.
12 Lord Ashcroft’s polling data can be found on his website at http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-kingdom-voted-and-
why/#more-14746. Accessed 26 Oct 2016.
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referendum, and the most obvious breakdown of voting 
patterns was geographic, with all of Scotland voting 
Remain, and in England, every region apart from 
London voting Leave. The vote share in Wales almost 
exactly matched the overall national result (52.5 per 
cent Leave to 47.5 per cent Remain), while Northern 
Ireland came out in favour of Remain (at 56 per cent). 
The share of the Leave vote was highest in areas where 
average levels of schooling were low; conversely, all 
20 of the ‘most educated’ local authority areas in the 
UK voted Remain. Not surprisingly, similar patterns 
were evident for occupational background: areas with 
large proportions working in professional occupations 
registered strong Remain votes, as did those with 
higher levels of median hourly pay.9 The Leave vote 
was higher in areas with large proportions of the 
population over 65, and lower where the population 
was younger. Given the prominence of immigration 
during the campaign, it is not surprising that this 
too featured in the result – although with some 
????? ?????????????????? ???????? ???? ????????? ??????
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votes (at 78 per cent), yet fewer than 1 per cent of 
its population was born outside the UK This trend 
was repeated on a large scale: of the 20 areas in the 
UK with the lowest level of EU migration, 15 voted 
Leave; of the 20 with the highest, 18 voted Remain.10 
Exposure to large numbers of EU migrants seemed to 
push voters towards Remain, and instead, Leave votes 
were closely connected to the rate of change of EU 
migration: those areas which had seen a rapid increase 
in migrants arriving from the rest of Europe— such 
as Redditch or Lincoln—voted strongly for Leave.11 
But cutting through all these patterns a narrative 
began to emerge linking the Brexit vote to identity. 
Of those who saw themselves as ‘equally British and 
English’ the vote was evenly split between Leave and 
???????? ???? ??? ???? ????? ??? ?????????? ?????????? ???
‘English only’ voted Leave. At the other end of the 
scale, those who were ‘British not English’ voted—
by 60 per cent to 40 per cent—for Remain. Those 
who saw causes such as multiculturalism, feminism, 
environmentalism and globalisation as forces for 
good voted for Remain, while those holding negative 
perceptions of these voted by a large majority for 
Leave.12 For many Leave voters, the decision was 
based on sovereignty, as they agreed with the principle 
that the UK should be able to take its own decisions; 
behind this came a desire to reduce immigration, and 
a fear that European integration was out of control. 
Remain voters, meanwhile, sidelined concerns about 
sovereignty and immigration in favour of practical 
economic issues: the most common reason given was 
that the risks (to the economy, jobs and prices) of 
leaving were too great.
The net result of all this seems to be that Leave won 
???????? ??? ??????? ?? ??????? ??????????????? ??? ??????
Britons who felt they had been left behind by the 
rapid, but regionally uneven, economic development 
since the eastern enlargement, if not since Maastricht. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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a whole, but had also left great swathes of the country 
behind; and on top of this, decades of neglect (and 
sometimes intervention) by central government had 
failed to revitalise previously prosperous areas where 
heavy industries had been shut down: in March 
2016, The Economist had described Blackpool as a 
‘town they forgot to close down’, a sad underside to 
Osborne’s metropolitan revolution.13 For people in 
????????????? ??????????????????????????????????? ????????
and the referendum gave them a chance to be heard. 
The Remain campaign failed because it tried to press 
home negative economic arguments, but also largely 
because it struggled to forge a positive narrative in 
favour of continued membership. In turn, Leave’s 
refusal to engage with the details of the economic 
?????????? ????? ????????? ???????????????????????????
???? ????????? ??? ???? ???????????? ???? ???????????
obsession of the British media with the legalistic 
technicalities of membership, and redolent too of 
the failure of the British public to form an emotional 
???????????????? ???????????????????????????????????
European membership. If the economic messages got 
through at all, voters either dismissed them as ‘Project 
Fear’, or were willing to bear a little economic pain 
???? ???? ???????? ??????? ??? ?????????? ???????????? ????
control.14 The result was that the public discourse on 
Brexit was steered away from a serious tackling of 
thorny details, and towards a breezy optimism and 
utterly unfounded expectations. 
To round of Act I, then, the roots of the current 
situation are in place: the parties were internally 
divided over EU membership, and the country was 
shorn almost in half. The tenor of the public debate 
during the campaign was set by Leave’s strategy of 
actively shutting down discussion of the practicalities 
of how Brexit could be delivered, which in turn meant 
that there was precious little engagement with such 
?? ????????????????
Act II: Brexit present
Scene 1: June 2016 – March 2017
The second act opens with the almost farcical 
internal power struggle following David Cameron’s 
resignation on the 24th June. The heavyweights of 
the Leave campaign – Gove and Johnson – and a 
distinct lightweight in Andrea Leadsom, jostled for 
dominance, knifed each other in the back and were 
left by the side of the road as Theresa May slid into 
Number 10. She had been Home Secretary in the 
previous government, and had a built a reputation 
???? ????????? ???? ???????????? ?????????? ???? ?????
newly installed as Prime Minister (PM), she was 
charged with delivering Brexit. The ballot paper had 
only set out a binary choice, and Leave had been 
??????????? ?????? ????? ??? ????? ??? ???????? ???????
detail about what form Brexit should take, but over 
the campaign two broad options had coalesced. At the 
basic minimum, Brexit would see the UK leaving the 
EU’s institutions, no longer sending members to the 
Parliament, nor having representation in the Council, 
nor contributing a Commissioner or any judges. 
Extending this further gave ‘hard Brexit’, whereby 
the UK would also leave the Single Market and the 
Customs Union; and at the other end of the spectrum 
was ‘soft Brexit’, under which the UK would leave 
the political institutions but remain – like Norway, 
perhaps – inside the trading arrangements.
13 ‘A coastal town they forgot to close down’, The Economist, 19 March 2016. http://www.economist.com/news/britain/21695053-sad-
underside-george-osbornes-metropolitan-revolution-coastal-town-they-forgot-close. Accessed 26 Oct 2016.
14 On this point, see Oliver Daddow (2016). ‘Project Fear is the legacy of decades of Euroscepticism: dare Cameron make a positive 
case for the EU?’, LSE British Politics and Policy blog. http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/project-fear-is-the-legacy-of-decades-of-
Euroscepticism-dare-cameron-make-a-positive-case-for-the-eu.  Accessed 26 Oct 2016.
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‘soft Brexit’ would require the acceptance of some 
form of freedom of movement, and the acceptance 
of the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ). But both had featured prominently during the 
referendum campaign: recall the many promises to 
take control of the borders, or to restore the sovereignty 
of British courts and British law. Conversely, a ‘hard 
Brexit’ would avoid these awkward costs, but would 
impose a severe shock on the UK economy, and, 
following the UK’s exit from the Single Market, the 
border between Northern Ireland and the Republic 
would need to be reimposed.
Having taken over from David Cameron, Theresa 
May set about selecting the model herself. One could 
say that her approach was a continuation of her modus 
operandi? ????? ????????????????????? ???? ?????? ???
hunker down, take counsel from a small band of elite 
advisors, and make up her own mind – with little 
?????????????????? ???????????????????? ???? ????? ????
was keenly aware of the resonance of the immigration 
issue during the campaign, and so feared a reprisal 
from the Tory right – and beyond – were she to opt 
for anything less than a full, hard Brexit. One might 
suggest that her loathing of supranational judicial 
mechanisms dated back to her time in the Home 
?????? ?????? ???? ???????? ???? ????????? ?????? ???
Human Rights; or one might suggest that she – as a 
Remain voter – felt a need to signal her credibility 
as PM to the euroscpetic wing of her party. Likely 
it was a blend of all of these; but the outcome was 
that the version which took shape over this period was 
hard, sudden and jolting Brexit. In a keynote speech 
at Lancaster House in January 2017 she set out what 
became known as her ‘red lines’: the UK would 
regain control of its immigration policy; it would 
leave the jurisdiction of the ECJ, and the EU’s body 
of regulations; it would pursue its own, independent 
trade policy; leave the Common Agricultural and 
Fisheries Policies; and stop paying into the EU’s 
budget.
The formation of this stance was decidedly private, 
???????????????? ?????????????????? ????? ?????????the 
newly-created Department for Exiting the EU – gave little 
detail of their intentions. There was to be no ‘running 
commentary’ on Brexit, and various attempts at 
scrutiny of the government’s position – by select 
committees, by journalists, and by the public – 
were knocked back.15 The usual response from the 
government was that to give out information would be 
to show the UK’s hand to the EU, but critical observers 
pointed out that perhaps the more likely scenario was 
that the government was simply struggling to master 
the complexity of the process or to form any coherent 
positions. In the spirit of this clandestine activity the 
government had hoped to be able to trigger Article 
50, and begin the process of leaving the EU, without 
??????????? ???????????? ???? ??? ???????? ?? ??????? ???
the Courts in early January, and was forced to gain 
Parliamentary approval. The vote was duly carried by 
a majority of 384 votes on 1st?????????????????????????
Labour MPs – including 13 members of the shadow 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
motion. On the 29th March, the UK’s Permanent 
Representative at the EU, Sir Tim Barrow, delivered a 
letter from Theresa May invoking Article 50.
15 Vincenzo Scarpetta (2016). ‘Steering clear of a running commentary on Brexit is the only strategy that makes sense at this stage’, 
Open Europe. https://openeurope.org.uk/impact/for-the-uk-government-steering-clear-of-a-running-commentary-on-brexit-makes-sense-
at-this-stage. Accessed 30 Nov 2016.
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Scene 2: April – December 2017
So now the clock had started, and the business of 
leaving the EU was under way. Weeks into the 
process, however, on 18th April, Theresa May called 
a general election. The purpose, as she explained that 
morning, was to solidify a parliamentary majority, to 
gain a public mandate for her Brexit strategy, and to 
present a show of unity to the EU. Two sub-plots were 
also evident. First, she saw this as an opportunity to 
crush Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour party, over whom the 
Conservatives enjoyed around a 20-point lead at the 
time. She hoped that by converting this into a three-
???????????????????? ?????????????????????????? ????
straightforward time passing the legislation required 
to implement Brexit; and also, having achieved Brexit, 
she could then use the remainder of her term to pursue 
policy goals related to her social agenda. Second, it 
is possible that she privately expected the economic 
impacts of Brexit to bite in the near future, and did not 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
campaign around 2018 or ’19, by which time the 
electorate might have sensed that Brexit was not going 
well and would look to punish the Conservatives. By 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
term, running from 2017 to 2022, and weather any 
economic storms that hit during the period. 
To make sense of the story we should skip to the 
election result itself, and then work backwards 
through the campaigns. The election was a catastrophe 
for May: rather than convert this 20-point lead into a 
???????????? ???????????????????? ?????????????????????
two points, and the working majority she had going 
into the election was pegged back into an overall 
minority. For the second time in a decade the UK 
???? ?? ????? ???????????? ???? ???? ????? ????? ?????? ????
the Conservatives on 318, with the combination of the 
opposition parties on 322.
Now to backtrack. Four explanations present 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
error by Conservative HQ in the conduct of the 
campaign. This was a ‘Brexit election’ – it was meant 
to be all about Brexit, and about who the British people 
could trust to deliver it, and the assumption was that 
the British public would dutifully put all other policy 
concerns aside and concentrate on this instead. Yet for 
all that, the Tory party continued its baseline policy of 
revealing nothing of any substance about what Brexit 
?????? ???? ???????? ?????? ???? ???? ?????????? ??????
be reconciled, nor about how the negotiations would 
be approached. They left the whole of the rest of the 
policy battleground up for grabs: the NHS, social 
care, education, defence, taxation, and so on; and to 
no great surprise, the parts of the manifesto dealing 
with these were equally thin, containing little beyond 
platitudes and little by way of concrete costings. 
When the document was launched it was found to 
contain several policies – such as the now infamous 
‘dementia tax’ – which should never have survived 
even the most cursory of internal reviews. Against 
this, Labour actually managed to muster some good 
policies, or at least, some policies which were popular 
and were presentable – perhaps not surprising, given 
that the party tends to dominate large parts of the 
social policy landscape.
The second great problem concerned the 
personalities at play here. From the very morning 
of the announcement, this was framed as an almost 
presidential election between two leaders and two 
leadership styles: Theresa May and her ability to 
deliver ‘strong and stable government’, against Jeremy 
Corbyn and his ‘coalition of chaos.’ The branding 
???? ????????? ????????? ?????????? ???????????????????
made any reference to the ‘Conservatives’, instead 
trumpeting ‘Team May.’ But recall that Theresa May 
had come to power without an election, and the public 
knew little of her beyond her reputation as a stodgy, 
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as Nigel Fararge put it, the more the public saw of 
May, the less they liked.16  In her media appearances 
she appeared wooden, given to trotting out side-bites 
and dodging questions; and as the campaign wore 
on this gave way to an angry, snide persona, given 
to glaring menacingly at journalists. This meant the 
press events and media appearances became an issue 
in themselves, rather than an opportunity to push 
her message: although she claimed to be touring the 
country ‘speaking to ordinary people’, in reality these 
events were carefully stage-managed and clinical in 
their setting. She rarely took unscripted questions, 
spoke only to friendly journalists, and refused to 
appear at the leaders’ debates, held on the UK’s main 
TV channels, claiming that she was busy preparing 
for Brexit (although, naturally, she wouldn’t let on 
exactly what she was doing).
The third part of the explanation was the terrorist 
incidents in Manchester in late May and London, in 
early June. Labour were able to capitalise on these 
events, in a roundabout way, by demonstrating that 
it had been Theresa May, as Home Secretary, who 
had pushed through cuts to front-line policing. These 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
that this was an election all about competence, and 
about personality. The gap between the two parties 
???? ????? ??????????? ??? ?????????? ??????? ?????? ????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
path, with the two parties often separated only by the 
margin of statistical error present in the survey data.
So we have a strategic blunder on Brexit and the 
manifesto, an awkward and unpopular leader, and 
???? ?????? ??? ???? ?????????? ??? ???? ?????? ??? ?????????
of weeks. But cutting through all of this was the 
fourth part, an enormous under-estimation of Jeremy 
Corbyn. It was already clear that he was a popular 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????
public sector workers left battered by seven years 
of austerity: his campaign rallies were regularly 
attended by thousands, and stood in stark contrast to 
May’s carefully-orchestrated appearances. But the 
Tories, alongside many pundits, were highly sceptical 
that this popularity could be converted into actual 
?????????? ????????? ???????? ?????? ?????????? ??? ????
apparent truism of British politics that the young do 
not vote. Only this time, it seems they did, as turnout 
in the two bottom age-ranges (18-24 and 24-35) rose, 
and Labour won these over the Tories hands down.17 
??????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????
on the home front, since the civil service were 
prevented from carrying out any meaningful work 
under purdah rules. After the results came in there was 
???????? ???????????? ????????????????????????????????
and-supply pact with the Democratic Unionist Party 
(DUP), who had themselves been staunchly pro-
Brexit during the referendum campaign. Once the 
new government was in place the process could begin 
in earnest, and on 19th June David Davis met the EU 
chief negotiator, Michel Barnier, to formally open the 
talks. Despite some initial objections from Davis, the 
two sides settled on an overall sequence, whereby 
discussion could only take place on a future trading 
relationship after agreement had been reached on 
three issues: the rights of EU citizens living in the UK 
(and vice versa), the settling of the UK’s outstanding 
?????????????????????? ???? ???? ?????????? ???????????
between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. 
Also agreed on were the more precise details on the 
16 David Singleton (2017). ‘May manages to make an enemy of The Economist… and Nigel Farage’, Total Politics. https://www.
totalpolitics.com/articles/news/may-manages-make-enemy-economist…-and-nigel-farage. Accessed 20 Aug 2017.
17 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Journal of Inter-Regional Studies: Regional and Global Perspectives (JIRS) — Vol.1
32
schedule of the talks, which was constructed to allow 
Barnier frequent opportunities to report back to the 
European Council.
From there, though, little progress was made over 
the summer and autumn. This was partly down to the 
customary emptying of Brussels during the holiday 
season, but it also arose from a distinct lack of a 
clearly-articulated position from the UK government 
on the three ‘Phase 1’ items. Referring to the prospect 
of the UK paying a divorce bill, Boris Johnson told 
the Commons that the EU could ‘go whistle’, but this 
sentiment sat awkwardly alongside the acceptance 
from the Philip Hammond, and thus from the 
Treasury, that the UK would pay. On citizens’ rights, 
ideas were passed back and forth through the summer 
between the two negotiating teams, but disagreements 
over the ongoing role of the ECJ in safeguarding those 
???????????????????????? ???????????????????????????? ????
was to almost derail proceedings in the winter – the UK 
government seemed unable to propose any meaningful 
plans for Northern Ireland: position papers spoke 
vaguely of ‘frictionless borders’, and of technological 
solutions to the problem of customs checks.
The frustration of all parties was laid bare in the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
talks. It seemed a fresh impetus was needed, and so 
on 22nd September Theresa May gave a speech in the 
Italian city of Florence. Where her earlier address spoke 
of ‘red lines’, this one struck a more positive tone, 
and in its opening lines sought to assuage concerns 
that the UK somehow hoped to use to Brexit to bring 
about the breakup of the EU. ‘The EU is beginning a 
new chapter in the story of its development’, she said, 
‘[and] we don’t want to stand in the way of that.’18 
Beyond this talk of strong cooperation between a 
reforming EU and an independent UK, May also 
used the speech to signal some changes in the UK’s 
position, but these were, in truth, a mixed bag. Most 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????
seek an ‘implementation period’, running for two 
years from the end of the Article 50 process and 
allowing all parties to establish the many legal and 
institutional precursors to the new trading relationship. 
Crucially, the period was presented as a continuation 
of the status quo, meaning that the UK would 
continue to abide by existing EU rules – including 
the free movement of people and the jurisdiction of 
the ECJ – in return for business-as-usual access to 
the Single Market. On the issue of money, she was 
clear that the UK would ‘honour commitments it has 
made during the period of our membership.’ She also 
moved to clarify the rights of EU citizens in the UK, 
promising to write protections into the terms of the 
exit treaty, thereby putting them beyond the reach 
of MPs, and at the same time accepting the ongoing 
role of the ECJ in settling disputes over those rights. 
But on the question of the Irish border nothing new 
was forthcoming – simply a re-statement of the usual 
pledge to avoid a hard border, and likewise, on the 
issue of the UK’s future trading relationship with the 
EU, she reiterated a now familiar line that the UK 
seek a bespoke deal, rather than accept one based on 
the relationship between the EU and either Norway 
or Canada (respectively the ‘high access / high cost’ 
and ‘low access / low cost’ models). The only area 
of movement on this front was on the question of 
the legal oversight of this relationship, where she 
accepted a ‘strong and appropriate dispute resolution 
mechanism' would be needed, involving formal 
cooperation between the ECJ and British courts.
The Florence speech was also intended for domestic 
18 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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audiences, and came in middle of the conference 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????
some internal dispute, backed a call for the terms 
of the Brexit deal to be put country in a second 
referendum. As week later, in Brighton, the Labour 
Party conference also looked set to be marked by a 
falling out over Brexit, until a poll of the delegates 
present generated an agenda for discussion which 
omitted the issue altogether. Thus the rumbling discord 
between the leadership – particularly Jeremy Corbyn 
and John McDonnell – and pro-Europeans was kept 
private, and the conference backed a brief document 
put together in response to accusations that the party 
had deliberately avoided engaging with the issue. The 
statement continued Labour’s ambiguous, verging on 
incoherent, position on Brexit: the party would seek a 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the EU’, and would oppose any solution that led to 
a hard border with Ireland, but little detail on how 
either would be achieved was forthcoming. Jeremy 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????
party’s travails and instead attacked the Tories’ Brexit 
strategy, accusing it of being divisive and shambolic.
Among the domestic audiences, though, the most 
important was May’s own party. The lack of progress 
in the negotiations stemmed from Tory divisions – 
from Cabinet to Parliamentary party to grassroots 
membership – over Brexit. On 15th September Boris 
Johnson had published a 4,000-word ‘alternative 
manifesto’19 in The Daily Telegraph, and his 
????????????????? ??????????????? ??? ??????????? ????????
on how Brexit should be delivered – opting instead 
for glib platitudes and a repeat of the now-infamous 
£350m promise – but for what it showed of the 
author’s naked ambition for leadership. The divisions 
???? ???????? ???? ?????? ?????? ???? ????? ?????????? ???
May’s premiership had been kept behind a paper-thin 
veneer of unity; yet here was the Foreign Secretary 
opening challenging the authority of his Prime 
Minister. A week after the Florence speech he doubled 
down, using an interview with The Sun to insist that 
the transition period should last ‘not a second longer’ 
than two years.20 
In this climate of open dissent, Theresa May took to 
the podium at the Tory conference. She was apologetic 
for the election debacle, re-stated the key points of her 
Florence speech, and set out a range of more business-
as-usual policies for the government: a reform to 
the system of university tuition fees, £2bn allocated 
to fund the building of social housing, and a cap on 
energy prices. For a speech that aimed to reassert the 
force of her leadership, though, it was a disaster. She 
???? ????? ???????????? ??? ?? ??????????????????? ?? ????
(the tax document on receives at the termination of 
one’s employment), and then by a persistent cough; 
soon afterwards, the backdrop behind her began to fall 
apart, with letters dropping from the words ‘Building 
a country that works for everyone’ like an apt visual 
metaphor for her leadership.
The Prime Minister’s performance at the conference 
may have been disappointing, but the Florence speech 
did succeed in unblocking the negotiations. The EU 
now had a clearer sense of the government’s priorities 
and negotiating position on the three ‘big ticket’ 
items, and so the focus of the talks moved onto the 
question of the border with Ireland, which was seen as 
the most problematic of the three. Formally the talks 
were between the European Commission (acting on 
behalf of the Council) and the British government, but 
19 Boris Johnson (2017). ‘My vision for a bold, thriving Britain enabled by Brexit’, Daily Telegraph. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
politics/2017/09/15/boris-johnson-vision-bold-thriving-britain-enabled-brexit/. Accessed 20 Oct 2017.
20 Tom Newton Dunn (2017). ‘BREXY BEAST Boris Johnson reveals his four Brexit “red lines” for Theresa May’, The Sun. https://www.
thesun.co.uk/news/4580334/boris-johnson-pm-brexit-red-lines/. Accessed 20 Oct 2017.
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on this question the Irish government was brought in, 
giving Dublin a veto over any deal which would lead 
to the return of a hard border.
By early December it appeared that a solution had 
been reached. After Brexit, Northern Ireland and the 
Republic would maintain two parallel, but distinct, 
regulatory regimes covering the many areas of cross-
border trade (agricultural produce, manufactured 
goods, energy, and so on), and this would negate the 
need for a hard border. The essence of the solution 
was captured in the phrase ‘regulatory alignment’, 
suggesting that Northern Ireland would remain in 
step with the Single Market – including, naturally, 
the Republic of Ireland. On 4th December, Theresa 
May travelled to Brussels for a working lunch with 
Jean-Claude Juncker, and everything seemed set for 
??? ??????? ?????????????? ????????? ?????? ???????
she was called away to take a call from the DUP, 
who refused to endorse the proposal. They could not 
allow any arrangement to come to pass which meant 
?????????????? ???????? ????? ??????????????????? ??????
to Great Britain, and it appeared that they had not 
been consulted on the draft text of the agreement. 
The following day, David Davis confused matters 
further by suggesting that, actually, the whole of the 
UK would stay aligned with the Single Market’s 
regulatory framework, stoking tensions with that 
wing of the party – of which Boris Johnson was a 
champion – who sought to use Brexit to launch a 
wave of deregulation.
All this took place a mere 10 days before the December 
meeting of the European Council, which was the 
latest opportunity to move to the second phase, while 
leaving enough time for the rest of the Article 50 
process to work its course. After a week of frantic 
discussions, a new agreement was reached: rather 
than a reference to ‘regulatory alignment’, there was 
now a pledge that ‘no new regulatory barriers’ would 
come about. At a press conference in the early hours 
of the 8th December, Theresa May and Jean-Claude 
Juncker published a joint report, which summarised 
the agreements reached on each of the three issues.21 
On the basis of this deal, Juncker was able to advise 
???? ????????? ???????? ????? ????????? ????????? ????
been made, and so, at the summit on the 14th and 15th 
December, the Council duly approved the transition 
to the next phase.
Two more brief episodes are worthy of note, both 
concerning the stormy relationship between the 
government and Parliament. First, the government, 
and in particular the Brexit department, had long 
insisted that it was conducting detailed research into 
the possible impacts of Brexit on the UK economy, 
but that it needed to be kept private since its release 
would undermine the UK’s negotiating position. In 
December 2016 Davis had said that his department 
was working on 57 sets of analysis; in October 2017 
he said that these went into ‘excruciating detail’; 
and then, appearing before a Parliamentary scrutiny 
committee in December, he admitted that they did 
not exist.22 A document was grudgingly released 
purporting to be the department’s analysis, but it was 
merely a lengthy synthesis of material already in the 
public domain, and contained little by way of impact 
assessments. Second, the day before the European 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????
the Commons in its attempt to pass the EU Withdrawal 
Bill. This contained provisions for ministers to begin 
implementing Brexit as soon as an agreement with 
21 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
22 Jim Pickard (2017). ‘Brexit secretary admits there are no impact papers’, Financial Times. 
https://www.ft.com/content/8ca38822-da75-11e7-a039-c64b1c09b482. Accessed 15 December 2017.
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the EU had been reached, bypassing Parliament and 
giving little opportunity for oversight. An amendment 
was tabled from the Conservative benches – by former 
Attorney General Dominic Grieve – to prevent this, 
adding to the draft bill a requirement for Parliament 
to pass legislation approving, and possibly amending, 
the terms of the deal before implementation could 
begin. The amendment was passed by four votes, with 
eleven Conservative MPs rebelling against their party.
So Act II ends with the closing of 2017. Public 
opinion on Brexit is as divided, and as inconclusive, 
as ever, as shown by the voting patterns in the general 
election and the numerous polls conducted in its 
aftermath. The political parties, with the exception of 
the Liberal Democrats, are divided, unable to muster 
clear positions on what form Brexit should take, and 
how it should be delivered. Theresa May’s personal 
style of leadership was exposed, and blunted, by the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
because the Conservative Party does not dare risk 
further chaos, or public opprobrium, by toppling her. 
In the resulting leadership vacuum, the government 
is unable to articulate clear priorities or preferences; 
indeed, there was no discussion on the future trading 
relationship with the EU in a full sitting of the Cabinet 
until December 2017. And in all this, there is obviously 
still little engagement with the complexities of the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
a new trade deal can be agreed by March 2019, to be 
‘implemented’ during the two year period.
Act III: Brexit future
In lieu of any concrete predictions, the third act instead 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of the process as it will unfold in 2018, and a tentative 
forecast about the type of deal which will emerge.
First, obviously, the parties remain divided. Both 
have had rebellious factions voting against the party 
line: Labour in the Article 50 vote in February, and 
the Conservatives in the amendments to the EU 
Withdrawal Bill, for example. The Labour Party 
has held itself to a delicate non-position on Brexit, 
perhaps preferring not to commit to anything concrete 
that might have to be delivered upon if they happen 
to take power in the event of another General 
Election. The Conservatives remain hostage to their 
eurosceptic hard right, and indeed to the DUP, both of 
whom are driving the party towards a hard and rapid 
Brexit. Yet the Government’s position in Parliament 
is fragile, as it is unable to muster a clear and reliable 
majority in support of such plans. Secondly, public 
????????????? ???? ??????? ??? ??? ????????? ??????????????
Notwithstanding some minor expressions of regret 
detected by a few polls, the public is as set on Brexit 
as it was in the summer of 2016: surveys report 
strikingly similar proportions in favour and against.
And so we turn to the consequences of the weak 
engagement with the practical details of Brexit, 
epitomised by the gulf between the Government and 
the EU. In as much as it has ever given an indication 
of its position, the Government has long insisted that 
it intends to seek a ‘bespoke’ trading arrangement 
with the EU. This is predicated upon a key element of 
the Leave campaign’s argument, namely that the EU 
needs the UK more than vice versa, and so the UK 
will be able to use this leverage to craft a brand new 
form of relationship, rather than one based on existing 
templates. Such a relationship would see the UK 
leaving all the political institutions, while enabling it 
to continue having access to the Single Market – but 
without being beholden to the EU’s regulatory regime 
????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????
slightly around the edges – with talk of implementation 
periods, for example – but nonetheless it now forms 
the core of the Government’s position.
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??????? ????????????? ??????? ???????????????? ?????????
point is that trading relationships cannot be 
‘bespoke’: they much conform to one of a small set of 
templates. There is membership of the Single Market 
via the European Economic Area (EEA), akin to the 
arrangement currently enjoyed by Norway, which 
would enable the UK to keep many of its current 
its current trading arrangements in place, including, 
crucially, the export of services; but it would require 
the UK to adopt all EU regulations, accept freedom 
of movement, and pay for access. Norway and 
Iceland would likely object to the UK joining their 
small club, and anyway, Theresa May has ruled this 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
terms of regulatory sovereignty). Alternatively, there 
is a ‘normal’ trading agreement, such as the EU has 
recently concluded with Canada, which would enable 
regulatory divergence and an end to freedom of 
movement, but would not cover services.
It is important to realise the roots of the EU’s 
insistence on these stark alternatives. Granted, the EU 
must keep half an eye on other recalcitrant Member 
States who fancy pushing for a renegotiation of their 
own position on a more favourable, individually-
tailored basis. But the EU must also seek to maintain 
the integrity of the many trading relationships with 
other third countries – which is precisely what the UK 
will be after Brexit. It cannot allow the UK to parlay 
its former membership into a new, arm’s-length 
trade deal with better access, or for less cost, than is 
currently enjoyed by other non-members.
Nevertheless, the UK appears to be pursuing a set 
of irreconcilable demands: a bespoke deal which 
allows the UK to leave the Single Market, and which 
somehow negates the need for a hard border in 
Ireland. The roots of situation lie in the persistent lack 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????
started with the weakness of the debate during the 
referendum campaign, when attempts to ask detailed 
questions about implementation were batted away by 
Leave. Then, once Brexit had become Government 
policy after the results of the Referendum and the 
General Election, there was still little progress on 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
several factors: Theresa May’s personalised style of 
leadership before the election; the preparation time 
lost during the purdah in April; May’s weak position 
after the election; and the Government’s desire to 
isolate itself from Parliamentary and public scrutiny. 
The Government’s choice of Brexit – indeed, any 
??????? ??? ??????? ?? ???????? ?????????? ?????????? ????
thereby disappointing at least one constituency (be it 
the de-regulatory hard right, the business community, 
or the DUP), but leadership has lacked the authority 
to do so.
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
confronted; but I suspect the EU will be the one taking 
the lead. Neither it nor the UK wants a disorderly, 
?????????? ???????? ???? ????? ???? ????????? ???? ???????
opinion, being so inconsistent on key issues, or on the 
??????????????????????????? ?? ???????????????????????
solution which, given the time available, the UK will 
have to accept. This brings us to the timetable for the 
coming year, and to a tentative forecast about the deal 
which will be reached.
First, the joint report which enabled the transition to 
the second phase of the talks must be written up into 
a legal document forming the basis of the eventual 
withdrawal agreement. This means that the pledges 
that the UK gave – particularly on the Irish border – 
will be made legally binding, and the Council has 
said that it will monitor proceedings carefully to 
ensure that there is no backsliding. Next, the Council 
document from the December summit set out the 
broad terms for the ‘transition period’, which will run 
from Brexit day until 31st December 2020. During 
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this time the UK will continue to implement the 
whole of the acquis: that is, it will continue to abide 
by all the EU’s regulations, including any new ones 
which arise; it will remain under the jurisdiction of the 
ECJ; and it will continue to participate in the Single 
Market and the Customs Union, and to comply with 
??? ?????? ???????????????????? ??? ???? ???????? ????????
of this arrangement began in January 2018, and in 
March, a new negotiating mandate will be given to 
the Commission by the Council. This will allow talks 
to move on to setting the broad political outlines 
of the future relationship – but the EU has made it 
clear that concrete talks on a new trade deal cannot 
begin until after Brexit day. These talks will run until 
???????? ??????????? ???? ???????????? ???????? ????????
involving votes on the proposals in the legislatures of 
the Member States, plus the European Parliament.
In other words, the EU has already begun to 
impose constraints into the process to circumvent 
the UK Government’s persistent ambiguity and 
indecisiveness. The period following Brexit will 
indeed be a transition, not an ‘implementation 
period’ (as Theresa May sought to label it), during 
which an already-agreed-upon deal is put in place, 
and elements of the obligations of membership are 
?????????????????? ??? ?? ?????????????? ???????? ????????
to keep the UK in the economic and judicial (though 
not the political) mechanisms of the EU, while a 
new trading relationship is established. To prepare 
for the eventuality of the UK Government failing to 
establish a clear position, the EU has begun work on 
a Canada-style relationship, and drafting the outlines 
of a long-term institutional structure to oversee the 
implementation of all the components: the transition 
period, judicial cooperation, the policing of the border 
with Ireland (hard or otherwise), and so on.
It is these long-term institutional structures which 
give an indication of the type of future relationship 
the EU has in mind, and which underpin the tentative 
forecast. For all the insistence on a deal based on an 
???????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
a long-term strategic partnership with the UK; the 
UK Government, in turn, has always said it wants to 
remain close to the EU in many areas of policy. The 
best way to facilitate such an arrangement – 
and where the EU seems to be going with its 
planning – is via an association agreement, similar 
to that it concluded with Ukraine in 2014. This would 
be based on a trade deal covering goods – as per the 
Canada model – which could be supplemented with 
bilateral investment partnerships. The legal framework 
of such an arrangement would be overseen by a joint 
committee bringing together EU and UK ministers 
???? ????????? ???????????? ??? ???????????? ?????????
that regulations in the two markets remained aligned 
in their intent and outcome, if not in their content and 
approach. This would be of particular importance 
on the island of Ireland, where, for example, formal 
cooperation will be vital in sustaining the shared 
energy market, and the future of cross-border trade. 
The arrangement could be extended to include 
cooperation on matters such as foreign policy and 
security, meaning that the UK would retain access 
to vital intelligence needed to combat terrorism and 
organised crime.
???????????? ???????????????????????????????????????
the Government’s position is a tension between two 
desiderata, both of which have their roots in pledges 
made by the Leave side during the referendum 
campaign: that the economic impact of Brexit will 
be minimised by maintaining strong links with the 
EU, and access to the Single Market; and that the UK 
will be able to use its newly-restored sovereignty to 
develop its own regulatory frameworks. Achieving 
both is impossible, since if regulatory sovereignty 
results in a divergence from the Single Market’s rules, 
then access will be restricted and the economy will 
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?????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
of these it wants to prioritise, the EU must press 
ahead with the Canada model and hope to minimise 
disruption. Secondly, even if this issue is resolved, it 
is likely that elements of the Cabinet – and certainly 
the wider Conservative Party – will object to the 
high degree of institutional cooperation envisaged by 
the EU. After all, if the UK ends up being under the 
jurisdiction of the ECJ in all but name, then one of 
the key red lines will have been erased. Equally, it 
is possible that we will see reticence from the ECJ: 
it previously pushed EFTA into establishing its own 
(quasi-)court, rather than sharing institutional power. 
???? ???????? ???? ???????????? ????????? ????? ???? ???
establish a set of independent regulators which can 
work in partnership with their EU equivalents in 
overseeing the implementation of the new rules-based 
framework. It would be important that such bodies 
could sue the UK Government if it did not implement 
the rules adequately or fairly, and this would sit 
awkwardly with the de-regulatory factions of the 
Conservative Party. 
In summary then, 2018 looks to be the year in which 
the UK government is confronted with its inability to 
construct a coherent negotiating request for the future 
relationship – the key protagonists are personally too 
invested in their red lines and absent a clear signal from 
the electorate are disinclined to change their minds. 
Since Theresa May cannot command obedience from 
her cabinet, we will see that the equation can only 
be solved with outside intervention, in the form of 
proposals from the EU.   This should not be a surprise; 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
negotiation according to their priorities and led the 
UK to December’s conclusion.
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